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Abstract
In a corporate tournament, executive directors are motivated by the prospect
of promotion to CEO, with winners receiving large increases in remuneration.
Tournament losers by contrast face a discrete loss in their valuation of their po-
sition, since the prospect of them becoming CEO is substantially reduced. We
argue that this oers an opportunity to test the predictions of tournament theory
by observing the quit behavior and the wages of the losing directors. We nd a
sharp increase in the likelihood that directors leave the rm. The directors who
remain receive an increase in their remuneration following a rival's promotion.
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1 Introduction
The Chief Executive Ocer (CEO) and their executive board are thought to play a piv-
otal role in the success or failure of modern corporations. This is reected in their pay,
the escalation of which has been the subject of intense debate amongst academics, in-
dustry participants and reformers alike (Piketty, 2014; Kaplan and Rauh, 2013; Gabaix
and Landier, 2008).
Whilst the upward trend in executive remuneration is noteworthy, the largest single
pay rise in a director's career occurs at the moment at which they are promoted to the
CEO position (Main et al., 1993). In order to understand why this might be the case,
we need to understand the mechanisms by which executive pay is set. Neoclassical
theory posits that all workers, including executives, are rewarded according to their
marginal productivity, which in turn is determined by their human capital. However
many commentators have been sceptical about whether the very large increases ob-
served on promotion actually reect a step change in productivity. More recently, and
especially following the escalation of CEO pay since the mid 1970s (Murphy, 1999),
economists have explored the possibility that pay at the top may be determined by
other factors. Gabaix and Landier (2008) develop a model in which the best CEOs
are competitively matched to the largest, most productive, rms. The growth of CEO
pay can then also be explained by the growth in average rm size. An alternative view
is provided by `managerial power' theories which suggest that CEOs inate their pay
via their inuence on the pay-setting process (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004), thus
breaking the link to productivity. The advocates of corporate tournament theory (e.g.
Lazear and Rosen, 1981) instead argue that the large CEO `prize' is central to how
organisations structure their incentives and motivate their workers. The logic of this
is that, within each level of the corporate hierarchy, a tournament develops whereby
success at one level leads to both higher earnings and entry into the next level of the
promotion competition (Rosen, 1986). At the highest level, the pay of the CEO reects
ultimate victory and serves to incentivise those at lower levels. It is the relevance of
this last theory on which this paper primarily focuses.
How then might we seek to distinguish between tournament theory and other theories of
wage determination? In this paper, we look at the compensation of all board members,
especially those who miss out on a promotion to CEO. We suggest that this provides
additional relevant information and the prospect of a cleaner test of the theory. We
argue that since the promotion event is a potential cause of dissatisfaction amongst
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the remaining directors who had hoped to win the coveted position, if the rm wishes
to retain these executives then we would observe wage increases for tournament losers.
These are otherwise hard to explain.
Moreover, by drawing on a panel of both winning and losing executives, we are able to
adjust for non-random attrition when estimating executive pay equations. Prior discus-
sions of attrition in panel data settings have tended to conclude that attrition, whilst of
theoretical concern, is often of secondary practical importance (Fitzgerald et al., 1998).
However, in our context, this is potentially important as losing executives may leave
the rm and bias the measured impact of the tournament on the executives who re-
main. Indeed in our panel of winning and losing directors, the correction for attrition
is statistically signicant and impacts on the values of the estimated coecients. We
argue that future estimates of executive pay equations and tests of tournament theory
should therefore adjust for such attrition.
2 Tournament Theory
The starting point for theoretical modelling of tournament theory is the paper of Lazear
and Rosen (1981), in which two risk-neutral workers (i = j; k) compete for promotion.
The likelihood of promotion p depends upon the level of output qi attributable to the
worker, which in turn is a function of the eort ei of the individual and luck i. The
cost of eort C(e) is positive and increasing (C 0 > 0, C 00 > 0).
On the assumption that the individuals seek to maximise their expected utility, the rm
will choose the payos for the winner W1 and loser W2 in order to maximise eort. In
equilibrium, equating the marginal benet to the marginal cost of eort gives:
(W1  W2)p=ei = Ci=ei (1)
Hence, the marginal benet of eort is increasing in the prize dierential (W1  W2).
Extensions to the basic model suggest: The prize should also be increasing in the
number of participants, since an increase in the number of players leads to a fall in the
probability of winning and hence a fall in the expected return to a marginal increase
in eort; A rm hierarchy should exhibit increasing growth in remuneration from one
level to the next, as the number of additional promotion opportunities decreases. At
3
the highest level, the dierence between winning and losing must compensate for the
fact that there are no further opportunities for advancement (Eriksson, 1999).
The extant empirical evidence on compensation within organisations is broadly support-
ive of tournament theory (Main et al. (1993); Eriksson (1999) and Bognanno (2001)) in
that eort is seen to increase with the value of the prize, particularly when the eld of
players is of a similar calibre.1 However, a number of caveats apply to these ndings:
Firstly, as noted by Prendergast (1999), a prize-eort correlation is evidence that incen-
tives matter but not necessarily that the reward structures have been designed to elicit
the responses predicted by tournament theory. For instance, Rosen (1981) advances
a marginal productivity justication for the convexity of remuneration through job
grades, on the reasonable assumption of imperfect substitutability of talent; Secondly,
a number of problems exist in attempting a structural test of the theory. Theoreti-
cal settings of tournament theory typically model a closed competition in which the
players in the tournament are clearly dened. In reality, employees in corporations are
free to move between companies and as such the prize of being CEO can be won by
an individual who was not internal to the rm.2 This should properly be considered
when considering the reward for winning an executive tournament, yet neither Eriksson
(1999) nor Main et al. (1993) consider the impact of external hires on the outcome of
internal tournaments. Bognanno (2001) identies the external hires in his dataset but
only briey considers how the presence of external hires might reduce the probability
of winning for the tournament player.
In this paper we argue that extra traction may be gained by considering the losers of
tournaments. The logic for this is provided by an implication of the model of Lazear and
Rosen (1981): participants in the tournament endure pay below market rates because
they value the chance of promotion (Main et al., 1993). However, once they have lost
the tournament the expectation of their future income has fallen. If their chance of
promotion has completely gone, then their pay should return to their external market
level. In the context of middle managers, Gibbs (1995) examines a single rm and shows
1Given that corporate wage structures are broadly consistent with the predictions of tournament
theory, recent research by Kale et al. (2009) has sought to examine whether tournament incentives are
successful in delivering increases in protability. Kale et al. (2009) nd a strong and robust relationship
between the prize dierential and rm performance. Of particular signicance for this study is their
nding that the tournament incentive is strongest when a new CEO appointment is due and weakest
when a new CEO has just been appointed, consistent with the view that directors suer a loss in
promotion incentives following a rival's appointment to CEO.
2To avoid this problem, prior studies have focused on sporting or other closed-form competitions
which preclude the possibility of an external winner.
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that when a manager is passed over for promotion their performance declines. This is
attributed to a failure by the rm to compensate for the forgone promotion incentive
since, in the context of middle managers, the cost of running a more sophisticated pay
scheme which updates to counter the loss of promotion incentive may be large. In our
setting, where the pay of top executives is reviewed by a remuneration committee with
the assistance of pay consultants, any administrative costs should be outweighed by
getting the incentives correct.
A potential complication of rewarding tournament losers may exist if rms resist increas-
ing their compensation because they fear that it will dilute the promotion incentive.
Firms may instead elect for an `up or out' employment model (Kahn and Huberman,
1988; Sattinger, 1993; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999) so as to increase the dierential
between success and failure and elicit maximum eort. Hence the loss of a tournament
may precipitate exit from the rm. This may also occur if the `outrage' of sharehold-
ers prevents the compensation of the losers of a promotions competition (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2003).3 Such an approach would be less appropriate if large investments in rm-
specic human capital are required, since an employee will be less willing to invest their
time and eort into non-transferable skills if exit is a real possibility.
The previous discussion therefore suggests two additional predictions associated with
the tournament approach to remuneration. First, the loss of a tournament may lead to
wage increase for losers to compensate them for the loss of promotion incentive; Second,
those losers that are not suciently compensated may separate from the rm.
The combination of pay increases and employment separations of the sort discussed
are not predicted by rival models of pay setting. A simple human capital model would
not predict any change in pay without an associated change in productivity. Further,
to the extent that losing a competition reveals information about the individual which
was previously private, the outside options of an individual might decrease following a
tournament, leading to a fall in wages. Finally, the match between the company and
a director may also deteriorate on the appointment of a new CEO, for example if the
director nds it more dicult to work with the new management team, or the board
doubts the ability of a losing director to work with the new CEO.
3Firms may be able to `camouage' additional payments by referencing changes in remuneration
strategy to the change in CEO, and the need to realign pay with this new strategy.
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3 Data
The data used in this study contains information on the executive directors4 of all
companies in the FTSE 350 Index.5 The data spans every nancial year end between
31st December 1996 and 31st December 2008, and therefore cover a full economic cycle-
with market growth until 2001, decline post 9/11 and the dot.com crash, followed by
recovery before the nancial crisis of 2008. The dataset includes full remuneration
details (other than pension benets) on all board members, who are identied with
precise appointment and resignation dates. To avoid survivorship bias, companies that
drop out of the index prior to 2008 are included in the coverage until the company is
wound up or taken private. Over the period of our data we observe 705 companies and
6228 company years.6
We have information on 5467 directors, with each director observed on average for 4.5
years. Certain data items, such as the return index, were obtained from Thomson
Datastream.
3.1 The incentive to win
Summary information on the remuneration of executive directors in the sample is pro-
vided in Table 1. The incentive to win the executive competition is clear: the mean
level of salary and total remuneration is 65% and 86% more for the CEO than for other
executive directors. As noted previously, although this large uplift is consistent with
tournament theory, it might also be a result of a CEO's greater level of responsibility,
status, and higher marginal impact on rm productivity.
4In the UK, executive directors are those directors, including the CEO, that make up the executive
management team and participate in salary, bonus and equity-based compensation schemes. Non-
executive directors, who only receive a nominal fee for their part time service, are not included in this
sample. In the UK, there is no legal distinction between the CEO and the other directors of a public
company (Main et al., 1996). Each director has their own service contract and all directors bear an
equal duciary duty to their shareholders.
5The dataset was provided by Manifest Information Services Ltd. The FTSE350 is the 350 largest
companies by market capitalisation that trade on the London Stock Exchange.
6Investment trusts that contained no executive directors were excluded from the sample, although
self-managed investment trusts were retained.
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Table 1: Real Remuneration by Position
Salary Total Remuneration Frequency
Position Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. NxT
CEO 420,603 318,623 1,279,526 2,365,904 4813
Joint Chair & CEO 384,405 222,183 818,244 951,247 552
Chair 344,548 250,071 786,364 3,030,140 1294
Finance Director 252,120 186,214 654,255 1,043,961 5430
Executive 254,157 179,725 688,114 2,548,257 12048
Notes:
1. Figures are calculated on an annualised basis with the requirement that a director served at
least three months of the nancial year.
2. Total Remuneration is salary, bonus, perquisites together with a grant-date valuation of equity
based incentives (i.e. deferred bonuses, share options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs)). The
grant-date valuation is based on one-third of the face value, adjusted for vesting conditions on
LTIPs. This approach provides a very close approximation to the Black-Scholes option valuations
which are more common in the US compensation literature. (See Gregory-Smith (2012) for full
details.)
3. All gures are in December 2008 prices.
3.2 The frequency and nature of tournaments
In our data 821 tournament events are identied when there is the succession of a
new Chief Executive. This amounts to one tournament for every 7.6 company years.
The number of tournaments peaked in 2001, although there is no strong indication of
cyclicality.
Table 2: The nature of tournament winners
Number of events 821
Internal winner 50.67%
External winner 47.99%
Returning director 1.34%
Notes:
1. Internal winners are identied as those CEOs who served in the same company as an executive
director in the prior year.
2. External winners are CEOs appointed from outside the existing board.7
3. We classify a small number of winners as `returning directors' who have a past history with the
rm but were external on appointment.
An interesting feature of tournaments is that the prize is frequently given to an outsider
(Table 2). Although a small number of these outsiders may have prior (below director-
level) history with the rm that we cannot observe, it is clear that the promotions
competition for the CEO post is not a closed tournament as in sporting settings, and as
is often assumed in theoretical work. One advantage of our empirical approach, which
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focuses on tournament losers, is that the hypothesised impact on wages and employment
is robust to internal and external appointments.8
What determines whether rms recruit internally or externally? Although this in not
the focus of the paper, Table 3 indicates that internal recruitment is more prevalent
in rms with larger boards, and in rms that are performing better than the industry
average. There is anecdotal evidence that shareholders have a preference for an external
appointment when performance has not been satisfactory in the hope that a break from
the incumbent managers might help turn the company around.
Table 3: The determinants of internal recruitment
ln(Sales) 0.0044
(0.40)
Number of executive directors 0.074***
(7.24)
Number of non-executive directors -0.0079
(-0.83)
% Insiders 0.079
(0.77)
Industry adjusted return on assets. Adj. ROA 0.0024**
(2.16)
Observations 753
Notes:
1. Marginal eects of probit model reported
2. z-statistics in parentheses
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.3 Tournament Losers
We now turn our attention to the losing directors that the tournament produces. The
`losers' are dened as those directors who have served at least 12 months prior to the
succession event. In the case where the prior CEO continues to serve on the board, we
distinguish between losing executive directors (`Non-CEO') and the losing CEO. We
are also able to separate the Non-CEO losers according to their losing position: the
losing Chair, the losing Finance Director (FD) and other losing executive directors.9
8We do not have access to the employment history of an external appointment unless they were
previously employed within the FTSE350. Hence our focus on the losing directors of the rm in which
the tournament occurs.
9We checked the titles of the executive directors to ensure that their job description does not preclude
them from promotion to CEO. For example, it is unlikely that the Head of Human Resources would
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Table 4 shows that each tournament produces approximately 3 Non-CEO losers. We
also distinguish between losing executive directors who continue to serve on the board
(`Non-CEO stayers') and those losing executive directors who exit the board (`Non-
CEO leavers'). Of the 2,311 Non-CEO losers, 734 exit the sample in the subsequent
year, with 56 reemployed by other rms in the FTSE350.
Table 4 shows that, prior to the tournament, the mean salary of Non-CEO leavers, is
$30,000 higher than those who stay with the rm. This conrms our suspicion that
leavers are materially dierent to stayers. This is reinforced by examining the smaller
sample of those who left the rm and were reemployed at the board-level in another
FTSE350 rm, where the dierence is almost $80,000. A naive comparison of the earn-
ings of losing directors before and after the tournament event would therefore ignore
the fact that the directors who remain are dierent to those who leave. This is also
illustrated in the table, where losing directors who stay in the rm receive on average
salary increases of almost $25,000 in the year after the tournament, compared with the
year before the tournament. Interestingly, the exiting losers who nd employment at an-
other FTSE350 company are unable to secure similar pay rises, with their remuneration
falling marginally.
Table 4: Pay and Exit of losing executive directors
Last Year in dataset? All
No Yes
Non-CEO leaver 56 734 790
Non-CEO stayer 1521 0 1521
Mean Salary year prior to tournament
Non-CEO leaver 335,104 287,342 290,855
Non-CEO stayer 257,236 - 257,236
Mean Salary year after tournament
Non-CEO leaver 332,737 - 290,855
Non-CEO stayer 281,027 - 281,027
Notes:
1. 790 directors (34.2%) exit within 12 months of losing the tournament. This compares with a
average turnover rate of 24.3%.
ever be in the tournament. In the UK, the Head of Human Resources is typically not an executive
director.
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4 Tournaments and the probability of executive exit
As discussed above, the occurrence of a succession event is likely to precipitate exits from
the board of directors. Most obviously, following a tournament, the old CEO typically
leaves the company, although 21% stay on in some capacity (normally as Chair) in the
next period.
Also as discussed, many losers leave the company around the time of the succession
event. Of those that have not won the tournament to become CEO about one third
(34.2%) leave the company in the same year. This compares with a normal turnover
rate of just under a quarter (24.3%).
Table 5 looks at this process in more detail by modelling the likelihood of executive exit
for individual i using a random eects probit model:
P (exitit = 1jwit; ci) = (witt + ci) t = 2::::; T (2)
Where, ci is the unobserved eect and wit are the variables that explain exit. In wit
we include the characteristics of the executive, the structure of the board and the
performance of the rm. Additionally, we include variables reecting the succession
event i.e. a tournament event in nancial year ending t  1.
As would be expected, older individuals have a higher likelihood of exiting at any point
in time, as do those in companies with a low return on assets in comparison with the
industry mean. A board with a high percentage of insider directors also reduces the
likelihood of executive exit.
The impact of the tournament event is also clearly seen, with column (1) showing that
the probability of exit from the rm is raised substantially in the year of succession
(18%). Column (2) of Table 5 examines how this impact varies according to whether
the successor CEO is an internal or external hire. Although both types of appointment
raise the probability of exit, an enhanced probability is particularly noticeable if the
appointed CEO is from outside of the company.
Table 5 also investigates the impact of the tournament on losing players in the next
nancial year. It is interesting to note that even those executives who initially stay
have an enhanced probability of exit in the next year (10 percentage points, `Non-CEO
stayer' column (1)). In column (3), this eect is broken down by the losing executive's
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position. Executive directors and Finance Directors are seen to be more likely to leave
in the next year than the Company's Chair. However, column (4) suggests that this is
only true when the tournament's winner is an external hire, perhaps to provide some
additional continuity to the rm.
Further evidence of succession planning is evidenced by the fact that a number of CEOs
who have stepped down and been replaced initially stay on in the rm. We see however
that their likelihood of exit in the next period is high (15 percentage points, `CEO
stayer' column (1)).
5 Tournaments and executive pay
Finally we turn to the question of the impact of CEO succession on the remuneration of
board members. As we have discussed, CEO tournaments generate winners and losers.
Whilst some of the losers remain on the board, some of the losers will leave. If this
attrition is non-random, as we suspect it is, then this will generate bias in the estimated
coecients unless it is corrected for.
Suppose that the model to be estimated is a linear, unobserved eects panel data model
as follows:
yit = xit + ci + uit; t = 1; ::; T (3)
where, yit is the remuneration outcome of interest, xit are its determinants and ci is the
unobserved eect. Wooldridge (2002, p.586) suggests that, because of the sequential
nature of the attrition process, it is natural to rst dierence the data in order to remove
the xed eect:
yit = xit +uit; t = 2; ::; T (4)
Since, conditional on being in the sample in the previous period, si;t 1 = 1, selection
into a period t  2 may be modelled as the outcome of a binary process,10 the following
10For simplicity we assume that such attrition is an `absorbing state' in that once a person drops
out of the sample they do not re-enter. This is an approximation in our data since 56 losers reappear
as directors in other FTSE 350 companies.
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Table 5: The probability of exit after the end of a tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tournament between (t  1) and t:
Event 0.18*** 0.18***
(27.7) (23.5)
Event: Internal successor 0.14*** 0.14***
(18.3) (16.90)
Event: External successor 0.24*** 0.24***
(23.1) (21.00)
Lost Tournament between (t  2) and (t  1):
Non-CEO stayer 0.10***
(10.1)
Chair 0.036
(0.89)
FD 0.096***
(6.01)
Exec 0.12***
(5.03)
Non-CEO stayer: internal successor 0.094***
(6.61)
Chair 0.11**
(2.04)
FD 0.060**
(2.50)
Exec 0.11***
(5.99)
Non-CEO stayer: external successor 0.11***
(7.83)
Chair (0.07)
(-1.17)
FD 0.13***
(6.00)
Exec 0.12***
(6.67)
CEO stayer 0.15*** 0.15***
(5.27) (5.03)
CEO stayer: Int. successor 0.14*** 0.13***
(3.60) (3.52)
CEO stayer: Ext. successor 0.17*** 0.17***
(3.81) (3.70)
Controls:
Age 50-60 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(7.78) (7.79) (6.80) (6.89)
Age 60+ 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(13.6) (13.5) (9.24) (9.42)
Number of executive directors 0.0028 0.0038* 0.0027 0.0037*
(1.38) (1.93) (1.35) (1.87)
Number of non-executive directors 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.64) (0.65) (0.61) (0.63)
% insiders -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.063***
(-2.94) (-2.89) (-2.94) (-2.88)
ln(Sales) 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0036*
(1.58) (1.62) (1.60) (1.65)
Industry adjusted total shareholder return 0.0048 0.0066 0.0049 0.0071
(0.75) (1.04) (0.77) (1.11)
Industry adjusted return on assets -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0017***
(-6.21) (-6.05) (-6.17) (-6.01)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,155 18,155 18,155 18,155
Notes:
1. Estimations based on random eects probit model. Marginal eects reported
2. z-statistics clustered at the level of the company in parentheses
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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attrition corrected regression can be estimated:
yit = xit + 2d2t^it + :::+ TdTt^it + it; t = 2; ::; T (5)
where d2t through dTt are time dummies and the ^it are the inverse Mills ratios from
the following T   1 probit models:
P (sit = 1jwit; si;t 1) = (witt) t = 2::::; T (6)
where in wit we include the same characteristics of the executive, the structure of the
board and the performance of the rm as in equation (2). Note that in (5) identication
of the tournament eect and of the correction adjustments is achieved by the timing of
the executive pay setting process: the tournament event occurs at t  1 and aects the
likelihood of executive exit, and hence the probability of survival between at between
t   1 and t; the nal settlement of executive pay is also determined by the rm's
remuneration committee at time t. Hence, when pay is determined the the outcome of
the tournament is known, with individuals either having triumphed or lost, and possibly
left the rm.
Table 6 reports the results for salary, with Table 7 the impact on total remuneration.
The rst column of each table reports a xed eect regression (equation 3), which is
standard in the literature, and gives the mean within individual dierence in salary
for the dierent job positions. The second column reports the rst dierenced speci-
cation (4) which allows us to focus on the impact of the tournament event and the
immediate impact on remuneration of transitions between positions.11
The third column controls for the non-random nature of directors that leave a rm's
board (5). In columns four through six we allow for a further element of selection, in
that we dierentiate between those individuals who leave the rm and gain employment
in another FTSE350 rm, from those who leave and do not reappear in the sample.
Columns four through six therefore represent our preferred specications.
Turning rst to the position variable, this serves to illustrate the extent to which other
members of the board earn less than the Chief Executive. Columns two through six
indicate that CEOs have a salary 15-17% higher than executive directors and total
remuneration that is 24-26% greater. The promotion to CEO therefore represents a
11We would hence expect the rst dierenced estimates to be smaller as observed.
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considerable prize.
Directors of bigger rms also receive greater remuneration,12 as do those whose rms are
performing well compared to the industry average, whether measured by total share-
holder return or return on assets.
Turning to the variables relating to the succession event, the winner variable indicates
that they will initially be appointed at a point in the remuneration distribution below
the mean for CEOs ceteris paribus. However as a result of their change in position the
winner of the tournament will receive a large immediate uplift in their pay. Table 7,
columns two through six show that newly appointed CEOs have a total remuneration
which is 13% greater than other executive directors.
CEOs who step down from their position but remain with the rm will experience a
fall in both salary and total remuneration if they move to become a `normal' executive
director. Movements from CEO are however typically, although not always, to Chair,
in which case their salary appears to be cushioned.
Turning to losing board members we see that, as implied by tournament theory, these
individuals receive an uplift in both their salary (2.5-3.9%) and total remuneration (2.8-
3.9%). Since we control for tenure and include year dummies, this uplift is above what
would otherwise be expected ceteris paribus. In column ve we separate the uplift for
the losers by whether the winner of the tournament was an internal or external hire.
The uplift is marginally higher in the case of external winners, but the coecients are
not statistically dierent from each other.
Column 6 separates the impact of the rst tournament loss from the second tournament
loss. This is because once a director has been passed over for promotion they may no
longer be an active participant in future tournaments and if not, they will have received
compensation for their expected loss. They will not then receive a pay boost after the
second tournament ends. This assumption appears to hold, as it is only the rst loss
that gives rise to the uplift, with directors who have lost before seeing no change in
either their salary or total remuneration (column six). This may help to distinguish the
impact of tournament loss from other possible explanations for for an uplift following
the appointment of a new CEO such as a compensation for disruption, or payments to
smooth transition (which would expect to be repeated).
12The elasticity with respect to company size is lower than often reported in the literature due to
controls for individual xed eects.
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It is important to emphasise that the uplift observed is not the result of non-random
attrition of executive directors since, as discussed above, in columns three through six
we explicitly correct for attrition. Although the measured size of the impact is slightly
reduced as we move from column two to column three and four, the eect retains a high
level of statistical signicance.13
6 Conclusions
Tournament theory predicts that directors will be willing to accept a level of remunera-
tion less than their marginal product if there is a prospect that they might become the
CEO in the future, with the large increase in pay that this entails. An implication of
this is that, should the directors lose a tournament, and hence experience a discrete fall
in the likelihood of succeeding to the post of CEO, they will need to be compensated in
terms of higher remuneration or they will leave the rm. This paper presents evidence
both on the likelihood of executive exit accompanying a change of the CEO, and also
evidence on the compensation of surviving directors.
The data suggests that the process by which directors leave the rm is non-random and
adjusting for this attrition is important when estimating the impact of tournament loss.
We nd that losing a tournament increases the probability of rm exit by 14-24%. We
also nd strong evidence that losing directors that stay with the rm are compensated
by a higher remuneration package. This suggests that the opportunity for promotion is
materially important to the director, as posited in the tournament model.
Recent reforms in the US and Europe have sought to make the remuneration of all
board members transparent and their actions accountable to shareholders. It is therefore
important to fully understand the setting of board pay. An implication of our ndings is
that prior studies of executive remuneration, which have failed to model CEO succession
may be missing an important part of the story. Further, since they have ignored attrition
and the impact of tournaments on executive exits, such studies will have obtained biased
estimates of the determinants of executive pay.
13The importance of correcting for attrition may be noted by the fact that the lambdas are jointly
statistically signicant (salary: 2(12) = 409.94, remuneration: 2(24) = 777.67).
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Table 6: The salary of directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FD FD FD FD FD
Corr 1 Corr 2 Corr 2 Corr 2
Tournament outcome in nancial year ending (t  1)
-Loser: Non-CEO stayer 0.064*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.025***
(7.05) (4.67) (5.67) (4.60)
{Ext. sucessor 0.028**
(2.48)
{Int. sucessor 0.022**
(2.51)
{1st Loss 0.028***
(4.49)
{2nd Loss -0.001
(-0.029)
-Loser: CEO stayer 0.20*** 0.049* 0.030 0.000050 -0.0001 -0.000
(5.08) (1.75) (0.89) (0.0016) (-0.0028) (-0.005)
-Winner -0.034*** -0.011 -0.000059 0.011 0.011 0.012
(-2.72) (-1.06) (-0.0053) (0.89) (0.94) (0.76)
Controls
Position (Relative to omitted base position of CEO):
-Chair 0.041 -0.078** -0.071* -0.056 -0.055 -0.055
(0.83) (-2.03) (-1.82) (-1.62) (-1.23) (-1.69)
-Finance Director -0.48*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.11** -0.11** -0.11**
(-15.4) (-5.99) (-3.86) (-2.43) (-2.12) (-2.91)
-Executive Director -0.42*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15**
(-19.9) (-8.74) (-7.65) (-7.17) (-6.62) (-7.00)
ln(sales) 0.021*** 0.0050** 0.0045** 0.0039** 0.0061** 0.0062**
(6.49) (2.08) (2.09) (2.14) (2.09) (2.14)
Tenure on board 0.048*** 0.0040 0.0019 0.0061* 0.0027* 0.0027*
(6.47) (0.94) (0.53) (1.89) (1.82) (1.84)
Outside equity < 5 0.024*** 0.0045*** 0.0042*** 0.0027 0.0039** 0.0038*
(9.89) (4.45) (3.46) (1.57) (2.12) (2.76)
5 <Outside equity < 25 0.0010 -0.00056 -0.00077* -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(1.20) (-0.88) (-1.74) (-2.70) (2.91) (2.76)
Outside equity 25+ -5.59e-07 0.00029 0.00023 0.00041 0.00041** 0.00041*
(-0.0012) (0.81) (0.85) (1.29) (2.04) (1.65)
No. exec directors -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0031** -0.0025* -0.0026 -0.0025*
(-0.76) (-1.63) (-2.07) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.80)
No. non-exec directors 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(6.60) (3.44) (4.95) (5.30) (5.07) (5.21)
% insiders -0.16*** 0.030 0.051** 0.045** 0.045* 0.044*
(-4.15) (0.89) (2.14) (2.31) (1.73) (1.93)
Industry adjusted TSR 0.011 0.012** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(1.53) (2.22) (3.16) (4.13) (3.93) (4.08)
Industry adjusted ROA 0.00036 0.00079** 0.00097*** 0.00086*** 0.00086*** 0.00086***
(0.76) (2.00) (3.12) (3.28) (3.76) (3.32)
Observations 19,571 14,533 14,533 14,533 14,533 14,533
R-squared 0.309 0.014 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.023
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attrition correction No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. t-statistics clustered at the level of the company in parentheses, bootstrapped in respect of columns (3)-(6).
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: The total remuneration of directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FD FD FD FD DS
Corr 1 Corr 2 Corr 2 Corr 2
Tournament outcome in nancial year ending (t  1)
-Loser: Non-CEO stayer 0.056*** 0.039*** 0.034** 0.028**
(3.42) (2.86) (2.31) (2.26)
{Ext. sucessor 0.044**
(2.03)
{Int. sucessor 0.016
(1.07)
{1st Loss 0.035**
(2.23)
{2nd Loss -0.029
(-0.78)
-Loser: CEO stayer 0.27*** 0.028 0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(3.38) (0.40) (0.13) (-0.092) (-0.12) (-0.12)
-Winner -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.11** -0.11*** -0.11***
(-6.96) (-4.59) (-3.18) (-2.28) (-2.78) (-2.62)
Controls
Position (Relative to omitted base position of CEO):
-Chair 0.084 -0.0091 -0.0050 0.0090 0.0090 0.0095
(0.91) (-0.12) (-0.034) (0.060) (0.070) (0.080)
-Finance Director -0.61*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.18** -0.18*** -0.18***
(-13.0) (-5.10) (-2.92) (-2.20) (-2.66) (-2.29)
-Executive Director -0.56*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(-16.1) (-6.78) (-3.73) (-3.74) (-4.01) (-4.47)
ln(sales) 0.028*** 0.0018 0.0014 0.0014 0.004 0.0043
(4.62) (0.35) (0.34) (0.30) (0.39) (0.38)
Tenure on board 0.073*** 0.0039 0.0027 0.0044 0.0074* 0.0074*
(6.34) (0.48) (0.28) (0.39) (1.78) (1.72)
Outside equity < 5 0.036*** 0.0089*** 0.0086** 0.0074* 0.0015 0.0013
(9.17) (3.69) (2.46) (1.69) (0.31) (0.25)
5 <Outside equity < 25 -0.00015 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0021** -0.0021* -0.0020*
(-0.10) (-1.11) (-1.54) (-2.08) (-1.72) (-1.72)
Outside equity 25+ -0.0010 0.00062 0.00058 0.00076 0.00075 0.00076
(-1.36) (0.90) (0.98) (1.21) (1.20) (1.49)
No. exec directors 0.011 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(1.57) (3.64) (4.73) (4.10) (5.61) (4.93)
No. non-exec directors 0.044*** 0.0096 0.0088 0.0085 0.0085 0.0083
(5.18) (1.25) (1.16) (1.20) (1.03) (1.33)
% insiders -0.22*** 0.069 0.082 0.068 0.069 0.067
(-3.25) (1.15) (1.14) (1.22) (1.29) (1.07)
Industry adjusted TSR 0.059*** 0.029** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(4.13) (2.43) (3.24) (3.44) (3.13) (3.32)
Industry adjusted ROA 0.0018** 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0020**
(2.12) (2.37) (2.41) (2.32) (2.16) (2.54)
Observations 19,642 14,584 14,584 14,584 14,584 14,584
R-squared 0.310 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.023 0.023
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Attrition correction No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. t-statistics clustered at the level of the company in parentheses, bootstrapped in respect of columns (3)-(6).
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Variable Descriptions
Variable Comment
Pay Variables All measures of remuneration are expressed in December 2008 prices, pro-rata
if served a period other than 12 months, subject to serving at least 3 months
of the nancial year. Total remuneration includes all forms of cash payment
excepting pensions and including salary, bonuses, perquisites and a grant date
value of options and equity incentives (one-third of their face value).
Position Variables We separately identify four types of executive position in our sample: Chief
Executive (including combined roles), an Executive Chair, a Finance Director
and other Executive Directors. In the UK, non-executive directors receive a
nominal fee and so are excluded from the analysis.
Tournament Event Identies the year in which the CEO was replaced. The succession is `internal'
if the new CEO was appointed from within the existing board, and `external'
otherwise.
Non-CEO leaver An Executive Director, Finance Director or Chair is identied as a Non-CEO
leaver if they leave the rm in the same nancial year as the appointment of
the new CEO, subject to having served on the board for at least 12 months.
Non-CEO stayer A director is identied as a Non-CEO stayer if they are still in the rm in the
nancial year following the appointment of the new CEO, subject to having
served on the board for at least 12 months.
CEO stayer If the outgoing CEO takes up another position in the company within 12
months of their resignation as CEO. For example, if the CEO assumes the
position of Chair.
Loser: non-CEO stayer A Non-CEO stayer, where the tournament event occurred in the prior period
in the panel.
Loser: CEO stayer A CEO stayer, where the tournament event occurred in the prior period in
the panel.
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) The dierence in the log of the return index from Thompson Datastream.
The return index captures both the movement in share price and income
from dividends.
ln(Sales) The log of Sales measured in $000s, annualized and in December 2008 prices.
% Insiders The number of executives directors and non-independent non-executive di-
rectors as a percentage of the total number of directors on the board.
Industry Adjusted TSR TSR minus the TSR of the median rm by Thompson Datastream's industry
classications.
Industry Adjusted ROA Return on Assets minus the Return on Assets of the median rm by Thompson
Datastream's industry classications.
Age The age of the CEO at the nancial year end.
Number of executive directors The number of executive directors at the nancial year end including the
CEO.
Number of non-executive directors The number of non-executive directors at the nancial year end excluding the
Chair.
Outside equity The aggregate number of shares held by outside major shareholders at the year
end as a percentage of the issued share capital. Outside major shareholders
are those holding in excess of 3 % of the voting stock as disclosed in the annual
report and accounts and who do not serve as directors of the company.
Tenure The number of years of service on the board.
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